

2011 SENATE GOVERNMENT AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

SB 2063

# 2011 SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE MINUTES

Senate Government and Veteran's Affairs Committee  
Missouri River Room, State Capitol

SB 2063  
January 13, 2011  
12894

Conference Committee

Committee Clerk Signature

*Kate Oiver*

## Explanation or reason for introduction of bill/resolution:

Relating to fees charged by bail bond agents

## Minutes:

Testimony Attached

Chairman Dever called the committee to order and opened the public hearing on SB 2063. Senator Joe Miller was there to introduce the bill.

**Senator Joe Miller:** See testimony #1.

**Chairman Dever:** You mentioned the other day that some people with an interest in this might be interested in coming and discussing this with the committee at a later time.

**Senator Joe Miller:** Yes, a few of the agents that submitted testimony were not able to come today but would be willing to come in next Friday if need be.

**Larry Mislowski:** Division Director of the Property and Casualty Unit within the North Dakota Insurance Department. In the interest of background information, bail bondsman's job is to make sure someone shows up in court. To do that they collect a fee in the process of that they attach material goods to the bail. The North Dakota Insurance Department position on this is that we are neutral.

**Senator Cook:** How many bail bondsmen are there in North Dakota?

**Larry Mislowski:** I don't have an exact number but if I had to guess I would say 50 or so.

**Senator Cook:** Is it a growing or decreasing number?

**Larry Mislowski:** No change that I am aware of.

**Chairman Dever:** Fees and mileage are paid by people taking the bond?

**Larry Mislowski:** At this point in time, with the Code as it is, the bail bondsman can charge 10% of the face value of the bond or \$75, whichever is higher.

SB So the new fee of the mileage is paid by the person taking the bond./

**Larry Mislowski:** Yes so indention to the bond they would be charged the mileage for the person.

**Senator Joe Miller:** If you look in the testimony that I provided from other folks, Deborah Chapman a bail bondsman from Minot (see attached testimony #2) and Victoria Palmer in Jamestown (see attached testimony #3).

**Chairman Dever:** If we passed this bill would our numbers be consistent with South Dakota?

**Senator Joe Miller:** I would have to check on that but yes, I do believe that is correct.

Chairman Dever opted to close the public hearing on SB 2063 but arranged for Senator Miller to bring in some bail bondsmen in to talk about this issue.

# 2011 SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE MINUTES

Senate Government and Veteran's Affairs Committee  
Missouri River Room, State Capitol

SB 2063  
January 21, 2011  
13190

Conference Committee

Committee Clerk Signature



## Explanation or reason for introduction of bill/resolution:

Relating to fees charged by bail bondsmen

## Minutes:

*No written testimony.*

Chairman Dever called the committee to order, roll was taken and all committee members were present. Chairman Dever then reopened the hearing on SB 2063.

**Senator Miller:** I have brought a few fellows from South Dakota they are going to come forward to offer some perspective on the bill.

**Dan Lederman:** Why we are here is we are trying to increase the rates for bail in North Dakota. Currently, there are limitations that we would like to see raised a bit to make it more feasible for the agents that we have here in the state.

**Josh Lederman:** The way the code reads now we are limited to how much we can charge. Because the standard amount for most offenses is \$500 and below, the 10% that is in the statute limits the agent to only being able to charge \$50. What we would like to see happen is an increase in the amount of rate that we can charge as well as, eliminating any restrictions on 2 types of administrative costs. The agent gets paid from \$50, we get a percentage as the bonding company and the insurance company gets their percentage. In the code as written there is a minimum of \$75 that can be charged and we would like to see that increased to \$150 or stop the limit on charging for mileage or we could have an across the board increase or a scaled increase, 10-20% increase from \$75-150 as a minimum and being able to charge mileage when agents leave their home to get to the jail. It is hard to get a person to drive 100 miles to do a bond when they will only be receiving \$40.

**Vice Chairman Sorvaag:** You work in 9 states, do they all use graduated rates?

**Josh Lederman:** Of the states that we operate in Colorado is the only one that uses a graduated rate.

**Vice Chairman Sorvaag:** Any as low as North Dakota

**Josh Lederman:** No 10% is the floor, nowhere is lower than that. In Wyoming there is a graduated scale in place but it was set by the free market. There it's 15% to \$10,000 & 10% over that.

**Chairman Dever:** The bill says may not charge more than so it seems to me that you could charge less.

**Josh Lederman:** I think that the then we come up against the rule of the insurance division which sets the rate of what insurance companies have to charge.

**Senator Cook:** If bail is \$1,000 the client can pay cash, if he has the means to do so. If he does not he becomes a customer of a bail bondsmen.

**Josh Lederman:** The client has a few options; he can wait and see the judge the following morning and asked to be released on his own recognizance but he may still have to post the \$1,000 bond.

**Senator Cook:** Who generally calls you? Is it the client themselves or someone acting on their behalf.

**Josh Lederman:** It is pretty even, 50% of the time it is the client and 50% of the time it is someone acting on their behalf.

**Senator Cook:** How do you determine the risk?

**Josh Lederman:** We have a number of questions that we ask; there is a computer system that we have developed to help in accessing risk.

**Senator Cook:** You have the right to say no? Do you have flexibility in the terms?

**Josh Lederman:** Yes and no we don't. We have to charge what is set in code.

**Senator Cook:** Is it the bond company that needs to be registered with the insurance department or is it the insurance company that underwrites you.

**Josh Lederman:** Seneca insurance underwrites us.

**Vice Chairman Sorvaag:** Do you all pay the same rate?

**Josh Lederman:** Yes.

**Chairman Dever:** Do you have to conduct the interview in person?

**Josh Lederman:** The only place where we can do everything over the phone and then fax in a bond is Wyoming because the distances are so great. If the market is viable local bondsmen will be there to take care of the business.

**Chairman Dever:** Where do you have agents in North Dakota?

**Josh Lederman:** Started with one in Fargo; we have expanded the best we can.

**Chairman Dever:** Somewhere I got the impression that insurance agents moonlighted as bail bondsmen.

**Josh Lederman:** Some are, we have one and in some small communities have been.

**Senator Berry:** Do you see the current system restricting people abilities in North Dakota to obtain bond?

**Josh Lederman:** Yes. In small counties it makes it hard to get someone to work for us. By having another avenue for release helps. In counties where there are no bonding companies it is restrictive.

**Senator Berry:** At what price make it tougher to obtain bond if they are not able to afford it. Where do you foresee that?

**Josh Lederman:** In some cases, our company we do allow defendants to make payments as long as they have fully collateralized bonds and premium.

**Senator Berry:** An indigent person may not have that collateral. I realize that the edge at what point do you make it available. If the rates are too high do we penalize people?

**Josh Lederman:** There are always going to be people that we can't get out of jail. Also, since if you think about a \$300 bond where we can charge \$75 but times have changed from the 1970's where \$75 meant more. Raising the \$75 fee to \$150 may not make that big of a change. Raising something from \$500 to \$1000 there would be more people impacted.

**Senator Berry:** Have the codes kept up with inflation?

**Josh Lederman:** I don't know for sure but my guess is that South Dakota & North Dakota are quite old. Our bond for drunk driving in Iowa was \$500 in 1975 and it is \$300 in North Dakota currently. I believe that those bond schedules may not have been addressed in years.

**Senator Nelson:** In Illinois they abolished bail bonds and established a state system

**Josh Lederman:** Wisconsin and Kentucky are like that as well. Now if you get put into jail in Illinois you put your 10% into the general fund of the state and you go to court and you get back 80% of that if you go to all your court dates.

**Chairman Dever:** The bond is set by the schedule.

**Josh Lederman:** Usually 8am the next morning but every county is different in that respect.

**Senator Cook:** If a person is arrested and the bond is set at \$500 you write the check for \$500, correct?

**Josh Lederman:** Wrong. We turn in 2 pieces of paper: a bail bond form which is developed by the state and a power of attorney from the insurance company we work for.

There was no further discussion on SB 2063 and the committee decided to hold off on acting on the bill until a later date. Chairman Dever then closed the discussion on SB 2063.

# 2011 SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE MINUTES

Senate Government and Veteran's Affairs Committee  
Missouri River Room, State Capitol

SB 2063  
January 27, 2011  
13513

Conference Committee

Committee Clerk Signature

*Kate O'Neil*

## Explanation or reason for introduction of bill/resolution:

Relating to fees charged by bail bondsmen.

## Minutes:

*Intern research attached.*

Chairman Dever asked the committee if there was any further information or amendments that the committee needed before making their decision.

**Vice Chairman Sorvaag:** I had the intern print out what Colorado was graded. The proposed increase is from \$75 to \$150 and Colorado's minimum is \$50 so it is lower than ours is right now. They also have 15% on the first \$5,000 and 10% on bail over \$5,000.

**Senator Berry:** In talking to the gentlemen afterwards and the issue at its core is the amount of money at the minimum so that they can have people work for them and be willing to drive to make the service available.

**Chairman Dever:** We have three issues here. What the percentage should be, what the minimum should be and what the mileage reimbursement should be. Is everyone comfortable with allowing them to charge mileage?

**Senator Cook:** The mileage is the part of the bill that I have problems with. I am not too sure what the problem is beyond their ability to be profitable. The way I look at it I would change the 20% to 15% and I would change the \$150 to \$100 and take the mileage out.

**Vice Chairman Sorvaag:** The only thing is I would like for it to go back to 10% at \$5,000 or \$10,000.

The committee tabled the discussion and had the intern draft an amendment making the noted changes.

# 2011 SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE MINUTES

Senate Government and Veteran's Affairs Committee  
Missouri River Room, State Capitol

SB 2063  
February 17, 2011  
14653

Conference Committee

Committee Clerk Signature *Kate Oliver*

**Explanation or reason for introduction of bill/resolution:**

Relating to fees charged by bail bondsmen.

**Minutes:**

*No written testimony*

Chairman Dever called the committee to order, roll was taken, all members but one were present.

Chairman Dever passed out amendments for SB 2063.

A motion for a do not pass was made by Senator Nelson with a second by Vice Chairman Sorvaag, there was no further discussion, roll was taken and the motion passed 5-1-1 with Vice Chairman Sorvaag carrying the bill to the floor.

February 11, 2011

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO SENATE BILL NO. 2063

Page 1, line 6, remove "~~Mileage~~"

Page 1, line 6, after the boldfaced period insert

"1."

Page 1, line 7, overstrike "A" and insert immediately thereafter "In the case of a bond that does not exceed five thousand dollars, a bail bond agent may charge a premium, commission, or fee for a bond which does not exceed the greater of one hundred dollars or fifteen percent of the amount of bail furnished by the bail bond agent, but in no case may the amount exceed five hundred dollars.

2. In the case of a bond that exceeds five thousand dollars, a

Page 1, line 7, overstrike "not"

Page 1, line 7, overstrike "in an amount"

Page 1, line 8, overstrike "more than"

Page 1, line 8, replace "~~twenty~~" with "which does not exceed ten"

Page 1, line 8, overstrike ", or"

Page 1, line 9, remove "~~one hundred fifty~~"

Page 1, line 9, overstrike "dollars, whichever is greater"

Page 1, line 9, remove "In addition to the premium,"

Page 1, remove lines 10 through 12

Renumber accordingly

February 16, 2011

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO SENATE BILL NO. 2063

Page 1, line 6, remove "~~Mileage~~"

Page 1, line 7, overstrike "A" and insert immediately thereafter "If a"

Page 1, line 7, after "agent" insert "furnishes a bond, the bail bond agent"

Page 1, line 7, overstrike "not"

Page 1, line 7, overstrike "for a bond"

Page 1, line 8, overstrike "more than"

Page 1, line 8, replace "~~twenty~~" with "that does not exceed:

1. The greater of one hundred dollars or fifteen"

Page 1, line 8, overstrike "amount" and insert immediately thereafter "first five thousand dollars"

Page 1, line 8, overstrike ", or"

Page 1, line 9, remove "one hundred fifty"

Page 1, line 9, overstrike "dollars, whichever is greater."

Page 1, line 9, remove "In addition to the premium."

Page 1, replace lines 10 through 12 with "; and

2. Ten percent of that portion of the bail furnished by the agent which exceeds five thousand dollars."

Re-number accordingly

2013

Date: 1/27/14  
Roll Call Vote #: 4

2011 SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ROLL CALL VOTES  
BILL/RESOLUTION NO.

Senate Government and Veteran's Affairs Committee

Check here for Conference Committee

Legislative Council Amendment Number \_\_\_\_\_

Action Taken Accept Amendments

Motion Made By Sorvaag Seconded By Benny

Senator	Yes	No	Senator	Yes	No
Chairman Dever	X		Senator Marcellais	✓	
Vice Chairman Sorvaag	X		Senator Nelson	X	
Senator Barry	X				
Senator Cook	X				
Senator Schaible	X				

Total (Yes) \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Absent \_\_\_\_\_

Floor Assignment \_\_\_\_\_

If the vote is on an amendment, briefly indicate intent:

2013

Date: 1/27/13  
Roll Call Vote #: 2

2011 SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ROLL CALL VOTES  
BILL/RESOLUTION NO.

Senate Government and Veteran's Affairs Committee

Check here for Conference Committee

Legislative Council Amendment Number \_\_\_\_\_

Action Taken Do Pass and Amended

Motion Made By Sorvaag Seconded By Marcellais

Senator	Yes	No	Senator	Yes	No
Chairman Dever	X		Senator Marcellais	X	
Vice Chairman Sorvaag	X		Senator Nelson	X	
Senator Barry	X				
Senator Cook	X				
Senator Schaible	X				

Total (Yes) 7 No 0

Absent \_\_\_\_\_

Floor Assignment Sorvaag

If the vote is on an amendment, briefly indicate intent:

Date 2-17-11  
Roll Call Vote #: 1

2011 SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ROLL CALL VOTES  
BILL/RESOLUTION NO. 2063

Senate Government and Veteran's Affairs Committee

Check here for Conference Committee

Legislative Council Amendment Number \_\_\_\_\_

Action Taken DO NOT PASS

Motion Made By Nelson Seconded By Sorvaag

Senator	Yes	No	Senator	Yes	No
Chairman Dever	X		Senator Marcellais	X	
Vice Chairman Sorvaag	X		Senator Nelson	X	
Senator Barry					
Senator Cook		X			
Senator Schaible	X				

Total (Yes) 5 No 1

Absent Sen Barry

Floor Assignment V Sorvaag

If the vote is on an amendment, briefly indicate intent:

**REPORT OF STANDING COMMITTEE**

**SB 2063: Government and Veterans Affairs Committee (Sen. Dever, Chairman)**  
recommends **DO NOT PASS** (5 YEAS, 1 NAYS, 1 ABSENT AND NOT VOTING).  
SB 2063 was placed on the Eleventh order on the calendar.

2011 TESTIMONY

SB 2063



# NORTH DAKOTA SENATE

STATE CAPITOL  
600 EAST BOULEVARD  
BISMARCK, ND 58505-0360



Senator Joe Miller  
District 16  
P.O. Box 151  
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Cell: 701-331-1491  
[joemiller@nd.gov](mailto:joemiller@nd.gov)

**COMMITTEES:**  
Finance and Taxation, Vice Chairman  
Agriculture

Testimony before the Senate Government and Veterans Affairs Committee

Senator Joe Miller

## SB 2063 Bail Bond Agent Fees and Mileage Reimbursement

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am Senator Joe Miller of Park River. I introduce to you Senate Bill 2063 in which pertains to fees bail bond agents may charge for service and a mileage reimbursement option.

I offer you the written testimony of two North Dakota bail bond agents and a report that shows the trending increase of financial release.

I believe this bill will help keep this business viable and readily available to those in need of this service. I need not remind you of the rural nature of our state and the rise in gasoline prices. For many requiring the use of bail bond agents for release, it may become cost prohibitive for them to receive the services they need due to travel.

Bail bond agents help keep jailor costs low and prevent overcrowding. Jail staffs rely on prompt service and it is important to incentivize agents to work all through the night. A thousand dollar bond could hold a person in jail for an extended period due to the disincentive for driving round trip one hundred miles or more for a one hundred dollar fee.

Bail bond agents also work to ensure clients make hearings and removes costly burdens on our courts.

Thank you.

## STATEMENT OF DEBORAH CHAPMAN

I, Deborah Chapman, have been a resident of North Dakota since 1983 and a licensed Bail Bond Agent in Minot since 2008.

Due to the nature of the business, I am on call 24 hours a day, seven days a week. I not only travel to the local jail and police department, but to surrounding counties. I work closely with law enforcement officers and jail staff who rely on the promptness of my service. My ability to provide prompt service alleviates the time and expense of housing an inmate and reduces overcrowding.

The inmates I serve appreciate our industry's ability to give them a chance to return to their normal life during the course of their case. The cost of their release is placed solely on the individual and not the taxpayer.

The current 10% rate barely covers the cost of conducting business. I spend numerous hours gathering information about a potential client. Then once the bond is posted, making sure the client appears in court as directed. A majority of the bonds I post are small and the current rate does not provide a lot of incentive to post bonds late into night especially during our cold winters. The ability to collect mileage would also help offset the cost of higher gas prices.

I would request this committee to strongly consider the proposed bill change for the following reasons:

1. An increase in the allowed fee to 20% would provide bail bond agents additional funds to cover overhead costs and provide an additional incentive to post smaller bonds after normal business hours;
2. A set mileage rate would help offset higher gas prices; and
3. Bail Bonds save taxpayers the cost of housing inmates during the court process by placing the burden on the defendant and the bonding company.

Dated this 13<sup>th</sup> day of January, 2011.

  
Deborah Chapman

## Statement of Victoria A Palmer

I, Victoria A Palmer, am a licensed insurance agent in the State of North Dakota with the following lines of authority: Casualty, Accident and Health, Life & Annuity, Property, Variable Life & Annuity and Bail Bonds. I worked for 13 years as a Paralegal prior to becoming an insurance agent in 2002. I currently own and operate Palmer Insurance Agency in Jamestown, North Dakota. In addition to selling insurance, I am also a bail bondsman.

The majority of my bail bond work occurs after hours. I receive calls from the inmates themselves, their family members and the officers at all times of the night and day. I am basically on call 7 days a week 24 hours a day.

I travel to the local correctional center as well as jails in several of the counties in the surrounding areas. I work closely with the officers and jail staff and I have told them they can call me anytime in the event they have an inmate that needs my services. They are very appreciative of my services, especially when the jail is overflowing with inmates and they are short-staffed.

The Defendants who use my services also appreciate the fact that I am so available. Many of the Defendants work and need to get out of jail and back home as soon as possible. The service I provide allows the Defendant to continue working and take care of his family while his case is pending. In addition, it relieves the jail of the time, work and expense involved in housing a Defendant.

The majority of the bonds I write are small. The current 10% bond fee doesn't begin to cover the expenses associated with bonding a Defendant out of jail. I spend many hours on the phone with the jail, the inmates and their families. In addition I have the late night hours, the unbelievably cold weather in the winter, and the high price of gas to name a few. And should the Defendant not appear for court, there is time and expense in locating him along with possible relinquishment of the bond itself.

An increase in the bond fee is drastically needed. I don't know how much longer I or any other bonding agent will be able or willing to offer the services we offer at such a nominal fee. I continue to do it to assist the corrections center and help them out. In addition, I enjoy knowing that I am helping people get back to their lives and their families rather than being incarcerated.

The bail bond industry helps save the tax payers money by providing a service that alleviates jail overcrowding and time managing inmates. It does not cost the taxpayer anything when a defendant requires a bond. The total cost of the Defendant's release is placed on the Defendant and the bondsman who is providing the assurance the Defendant will return to court.

I strongly encourage this committee to consider the proposed bill change for the following reasons:

- 1) A set mileage rate would allow bail agents to re-coup the cost of travel to jails due to increased gas prices;
- 2) An increase to 20% in the allowed fee charged to the defendant would provide a bail agent additional funds to cover overhead expenses and would give them additional incentive to post bonds during non-traditional working hours. A majority of set bonds are between \$250.00 - \$1000.00 with the minimum fee charged to the client of \$75.00; and
- 3) Bail bonds save taxpayers the cost of housing inmates during the court process and places the burden on the bail company.

Dated this 12<sup>th</sup> day of January, 2011.

  
Victoria A Palmer



## Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report

November 2007, NCJ 214994

*State Court Processing Statistics, 1990-2004*

# Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Courts

By Thomas H. Cohen, Ph.D.  
and Brian A. Reaves, Ph.D.  
*BJS Statisticians*

Between 1990 and 2004, 62% of felony defendants in State courts in the 75 largest counties were released prior to the disposition of their case. Beginning in 1998, financial pretrial releases, requiring the posting of bail, were more prevalent than non-financial releases. This increase in the use of financial releases was mostly the result of a decrease in the use of release on recognizance (ROR), coupled with an increase in the use of commercial surety bonds. These findings are from a multi-year analysis of felony cases from the biennial State Court Processing Statistics (SCPS) program, sponsored by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.


Among defendants detained until case disposition, 1 in 6 had been denied bail and 5 in 6 had bail set with financial conditions required for release that were not met. The higher the bail amount set, the lower the probability of release. About 7 in 10 defendants secured release when bail was set at less than \$5,000, but this proportion dropped to 1 in 10 when bail was set at \$100,000 or more.

Murder defendants were the least likely to be released pretrial. Defendants charged with rape, robbery, burglary, and motor vehicle theft also had release rates lower than the overall average. The highest release rate was for defendants charged with fraud.

Defendants were less likely to be released if they had a prior arrest or conviction or an active criminal justice status at the time of arrest (such as those on probation or parole). A history of missed court appearances also reduced the likelihood that a defendant would be released.

About a third of released defendants were charged with one or more types of pretrial misconduct. Nearly a fourth had a bench warrant issued for failing to appear in court, and about a sixth were arrested for a new offense. More than half of these new arrests were for felonies.

Since 1998, most pretrial releases of State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties have been under financial conditions requiring the posting of bail



Logistic regression analyses that controlled for factors such as offense and criminal history found that Hispanics were less likely than non-Hispanic defendants to be released, and males were less likely than females to be released.

Logistic regression was also used to calculate the probability of pretrial misconduct for defendants with a given characteristic, independent of other factors. Characteristics associated with a greater probability of being rearrested while on pretrial release included being under age 21, having a prior arrest record, having a prior felony conviction, being released on an unsecured bond, or being part of an emergency release to relieve jail crowding.

Compared to release on recognizance, defendants on financial release were more likely to make all scheduled court appearances. Defendants released on an unsecured bond or as part of an emergency release were most likely to have a bench warrant issued because they failed to appear in court. The probability of failing to appear in court was higher among defendants who were black or Hispanic, had an active criminal justice status at the time of arrest, or had a prior failure to appear.

**About 3 In 5 felony defendants in the 75 largest counties were released prior to case disposition**

From 1990 to 2004, an estimated 62% of State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties were released prior to the disposition of their case (table 1). Defendants were about as likely to be released on financial conditions requiring the posting of bail (30%) as to be granted a non-financial release (32%). Among the 38% of defendants detained until case disposition, about 5 in 6 had a bail amount set but did not post the financial bond required for release.

**Table 1. Type of pretrial release or detention for State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties, 1990-2004**

Detention-release outcome	State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties	
	Number	Percent
<b>Total</b>	424,252	100%
<b>Released before case disposition</b>	264,604	62%
Financial conditions	125,650	30%
Surety bond	88,107	20
Deposit bond	23,168	6
Full cash bond	12,348	3
Property bond	4,027	1
Non-financial conditions	136,153	32%
Personal recognizance	85,330	20
Conditional release	32,882	8
Unsecured bond	17,941	4
Emergency release	2,801	1%
<b>Detained until case disposition</b>	159,647	38%
Held on bail	132,572	32
Denied bail	27,075	6

Note: Counts based on weighted data representing 8 months (the month of May from each even-numbered year). Detail may not add to total because of rounding.

From 1990 to 2004, surety bond (33%) and release on recognizance (32%) each accounted for about a third of all releases. Other release types that accounted for at least 5% of releases during this period were conditional release (12%), deposit bond (9%), unsecured bond (7%), and full cash bond (5%). (See box on page 3 for definitions of release types.)

Type of pretrial release	Percent of all releases, 1990-2004
<b>Financial conditions</b>	48%
Surety bond	33
Deposit bond	9
Full cash bond	5
Property bond	2
<b>Non-financial conditions</b>	51%
Recognizance	32
Conditional	12
Unsecured bond	7
<b>Emergency release</b>	1%
<b>Number of releases</b>	264,604

**Since 1998 a majority of pretrial releases have included financial conditions**

Except for a decline to 57% in 2004, the percentage of defendants released each year varied only slightly, from 62% to 64%. A more pronounced trend was observed in the type of release used (figure 1). From 1990 to 1998, the percentage of released defendants under financial conditions rose from 24% to 36%, while non-financial releases dropped from 40% to 28%.

**Detention-release outcomes for State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties, 1990-2004**




Figure 1

**Surety bond surpassed release on recognizance in 1998 as the most common type of pretrial release**

The trend away from non-financial releases to financial releases was accompanied by an increase in the use of surety bonds and a decrease in the use of release on recognizance (ROR) (figure 2). From 1990 through 1994, ROR accounted for 41% of releases, compared to 24% for surety bond. In 2002 and 2004, surety bonds were used for 42% of releases, compared to 23% for ROR.

**Type of pretrial release of State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties, 1990-2004**




Figure 2

### Types of pretrial release used in State courts

Type of release	Defendant	Financial liability for failure to appear	Liabic party
<b>Financial</b>			
Surety bond	Pays fee (usually 10% of bail amount) plus collateral if required, to commercial bail agent.	Full bail amount	Bail agent
Deposit bond	Posts deposit (usually 10% of bail amount) with court, which is usually refunded at successful completion of case.	Full bail amount	Defendant
Full cash bond	Posts full bail amount with court.	Full bail amount	Defendant
Property bond	Posts property title as collateral with court.	Full bail amount	Defendant
<b>Non-financial</b>			
Release on recognizance (ROR)	Signs written agreement to appear in court (includes citation releases by law enforcement).	None	N/A
Conditional (supervised) release	Agrees to comply with specific conditions such as regular reporting or drug use monitoring.	None	N/A
Unsecured bond	Has a bail amount set, but no payment is required to secure release.	Full bail amount	Defendant
Emergency release	Released as part of a court order to relieve jail crowding.	None	N/A

### Two-thirds of defendants had financial conditions required for release in 2004, compared to half in 1990

Including both released and detained defendants, the percentage required to post bond to secure release rose from 53% in 1990 to 68% in 2004 (not shown in table). Overall, about half (48%) of defendants required to post bail for release did so. From 1998 through 2004, 51% posted bail, compared to 45% in prior years.

### The higher the bail amount the lower the probability of pretrial release

The median bail amount for detained defendants (\$15,000) was 3 times that of released defendants (\$5,000); the mean amount was about 5 times higher (\$58,400 versus \$11,600) (not shown in table). For all defendants with a bail amount set, the median bail amount was \$9,000 and the mean was \$35,800.

There was a direct relationship between the bail amount and the probability of release. When the bail was under \$10,000, most defendants secured release, including 7 in 10 defendants with bail under \$5,000 (figure 3). The proportion released declined as the bail amount increased, dropping to 1 in 10 when bail was \$100,000 or higher.

### Defendants arrested for violent offenses or who had a criminal record were most likely to have a high bail amount or be denied bail

Courts typically use an offense-based schedule when setting bail. After assessing the likelihood that a defendant, if released, will not appear in court and assessing any danger the defendant may present to the community, the court may adjust the bail higher or lower. In the most serious cases, the court may deny bail altogether. The use of a high bail amount or the denial of bail was most evident in cases involving serious violent offenses. Eighty percent of defendants charged with murder had one of these conditions; with rape, 34%; and with robbery, 30% (table 2).

**Bail amount and release rates for State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties, 1990-2004**




Figure 3

**Table 2. State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties with bail set at \$50,000 or more or denied bail, 1990-2004**

Characteristic	Percent of defendants	
	Bail \$50,000 or more	Denied bail
<b>Most serious arrest charge</b>		
Murder	35%	45%
Rape	25	9
Robbery	20	10
Assault	13	7
Non-violent offenses	7	6
<b>Criminal justice status at arrest</b>		
Active	13%	13%
None	8	3
<b>Prior felony conviction</b>		
Yes	13%	10%
No	7	4

Defendants who had an active criminal justice status (13%) were about 4 times as likely as other defendants (3%) to have bail denied. Defendants with 1 or more prior felony convictions (10%) were more than twice as likely as those without such a conviction (4%) to have bail denied.

### Commercial bail and pretrial release


An estimated 14,000 commercial bail agents nationwide secure the release of more than 2 million defendants annually, according to the *Professional Bail Agents of the United States*. (See *Methodology* for other sources on bail and pretrial release.) Bond forfeiture regulations and procedures vary by jurisdiction, but most States regulate commercial bail and license bail agents through their departments of insurance. Four States do not allow commercial bail: Illinois, Kentucky, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Also, the District of Columbia, Maine, and Nebraska have little commercial bail activity.

Bail agents generally operate as independent contractors using credentials of a surety company when posting appearance bond for their client. For a fee, the surety company allows the bail agent to use its financial standing and credit as security on bonds. In turn, the bail agent charges the defendant a fee (usually 10% of the bail amount) for services. In addition, the bail agent often requires collateral from the defendant.

A bail agent usually has an opportunity to recover a defendant if they fail to appear. If the defendant is not returned, the agent is liable to the court for the full bail amount. Most jurisdictions permit revocation of the bond, which allows the agent to return the defendant to custody before the court date, freeing the agent from liability. The agent may be required to refund the defendant's fee in such cases. Courts can also set aside forfeiture judgments if good cause is shown as to why a defendant did not appear.

Commercial bail has been a target of critics since the 1960s. Some organizations, such as the American Bar Association and the National District Attorney's Association, have recommended its abolishment. Some critics have succeeded in obtaining reforms in the release process, beginning with the Manhattan Bail Project in 1961.

Commercial bail agents are active in almost every State



This project showed that defendants could be successfully released pretrial without the financial guarantee of a surety bail agent if verified information concerning their stability and community ties were presented to the court.

The success of the Manhattan Bail Project resulted in a wide range of pretrial reforms in the Federal system, culminating in the Bail Reform Act of 1966. This Act created a presumption in favor of release for most non-capital defendants and led to the creation of non-surety release options, such as refundable deposit bail and conditional release. Many States followed the Federal system and created such release options. The Bail Reform Act of 1984 set forth new procedures which allowed the pretrial detention of defendants believed to be a danger to the community in addition to a flight risk.

#### Pros and cons of commercial bail

Issue	Proponents:	Critics:
Jail crowding	Reduces jail population by providing a means for defendants to obtain pretrial release.	Increases jail population because indigent defendants can't afford commercial bail services. Others are passed over because they are seen as a flight risk.
Private enterprise	Provides pretrial release and monitoring services at no cost to taxpayers.	A private, for-profit entity should not be involved in the detention-release decision process.
Performance incentives	Creates an incentive that results in the majority of defendants being returned to court because the bail agent is liable for defendants who fail to appear.	Bail agents don't always have their bonds forfeited or actively pursue absconders.
Value of service	Provides the opportunity for many defendants to secure their freedom while awaiting disposition of their case.	The fee and collateral are typically more than indigent defendants can afford. Defendants who have the money would be better off spending it on legal representation.

**Financial releases took longer on average than non-financial releases**

About half of all pretrial releases occurred within 1 day of arrest, and about three-fourths within 1 week. Non-financial releases (59%) were more likely to occur within a day of arrest than financial releases (45%). For all release types, more than 90% occurred within 1 month of arrest. Among defendants released under financial conditions, the amount of time from arrest to release increased with bail amounts, ranging from a mean of 8 days for those with a bail amount of less than \$5,000 to 22 days for bail amounts of \$50,000 or more (not shown in table).

	Cumulative percent of releases occurring within —		
	1 day	1 week	1 month
All releases	52%	78%	92%
Financial	45	76	92
Non-financial	59	80	93

**About a quarter of released defendants had failed to appear in court during a prior case**

A majority (61%) of the defendants released into the community to await disposition of their case had been arrested previously (table 3). This included 27% who had failed to appear in court during a prior case. About half had 1 or more prior convictions (48%), and nearly a third (30%) had at least one prior felony conviction. About 1 in 4 released defendants had an active criminal justice status from a prior case at the time of their arrest.

**Table 3. Criminal history of released and detained State court felony defendants in 75 largest counties, 1990-2004**

Criminal history	Released defendants	Detained defendants
<b>Prior arrest</b>	61%	83%
With at least 1 failure-to-appear	27	44
<b>Prior conviction</b>	48%	75%
Felony	30	57
Violent felony	7	15
<b>Active criminal justice status</b>	27%	51%

**The role of pretrial services programs in the release process**

According to a BJA nationwide study, about 300 pretrial services programs were operating in the U.S. during 2001.\* More than two-thirds of the programs had begun since 1980 and nearly half since 1990. The programs operated in a variety of administrative settings, including probation offices, courts, sheriffs' offices, independent agencies, and private non-profit organizations.

Pretrial programs play an important role in the release process. Standards published by the American Bar Association and the National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies have specified core functions a model pretrial program should provide.

*Information gathering and assessment*

An important function of a pretrial program is to conduct a pretrial investigation to assist judicial officers in making release decisions. Prior to the initial court appearance, the pretrial program gathers information about the defendant, primarily through voluntary interviews and records checks. Some defendants may not be eligible for pretrial release because of the severity of the charged offense or an existing criminal justice status such as parole, probation, or an outstanding warrant.

\*John Clark and D. Alan Henry, *Pretrial Services Programming at the Start of the 21st Century: A Survey of Pretrial Services Programs*. Washington D.C.: Bureau of Justice Assistance, July 2003 (NCJ 199773).

Information collected from the pretrial investigation typically includes:

- residency
- employment status
- community ties
- criminal record
- court appearance record
- criminal justice status
- mental health status
- indications of substance abuse

Often a risk assessment tool is used to incorporate the information from the pretrial investigation into a score that guides the release decision. Periodic validation of the instrument ensures that it provides an accurate, unbiased measure of a defendant's potential for misconduct if released.

*Supervision and follow-up*

Pretrial services programs provide supervision and monitoring of a defendant's compliance with release conditions, such as testing for drug or alcohol use and electronic monitoring of defendants confined to a restricted area. These programs also assist with locating and returning defendants who fail to appear in court. Such assistance may include providing information to law enforcement officials or working directly with defendants to persuade them to return.

Pretrial programs may regularly review the status of detained defendants for changes in their eligibility for release and facilitate their release where appropriate.

Prior criminal activity was more prevalent among pretrial detainees. About half had a criminal justice status at the time of arrest. A large majority had prior arrests (83%) and convictions (75%). More than half (57%) had a prior felony conviction, including 15% with a conviction for a violent felony. Nearly half (44%) had a prior failure to appear.

#### Many factors influence the pretrial release decision

SCPS collects information on some of the factors courts consider when making pretrial release decisions, such as arrest offenses, criminal justice status, prior arrests, prior court appearance record, and prior convictions. It does not collect data on residency, employment status, community ties, mental health status, or substance abuse history.

The unique contribution of the factors collected in SCPS to the release decision can be assessed using logistic regression techniques. Logistic regression produces nonlinear estimations for each independent variable which can be transformed into predicted probabilities (table 4). In the case of pretrial release, the logistic regression analyses yielded patterns similar to that of the bivariate results. (See *Methodology* for more information on the logistic regression techniques).

Murder defendants (19%) had the lowest probability of being released, followed by those charged with robbery (44%), burglary (49%), motor vehicle theft (49%), or rape (53%). Defendants charged with fraud (82%) were the most likely to be released.

#### Male and Hispanic defendants less likely to be released than females and whites

Female defendants (74%) were more likely than males (60%) to be released pretrial. By race and Hispanic origin, non-Hispanic whites (68%) had a higher probability of release than Hispanics (55%). Pretrial detention rates for Hispanics may have been influenced by the use of immigration holds to detain those illegally in the U.S.

#### Defendants with a prior criminal record less likely to be released than those without a prior arrest

Defendants on parole (26%) or probation (43%) at the time of their arrest for the current offense were less likely to be released than those without an active criminal justice status (70%). Defendants who had a prior arrest, whether they had previously failed to appear in court (50%) or not (59%), had a lower probability of release than those without a prior arrest (79%).

Defendants with a prior conviction (51%, not shown in table) had a lower probability of being released than those without a conviction (77%). This was true even if the prior convictions were for misdemeanors only (63%). The effect of a conviction record on release was more pronounced if the defendant had at least one prior felony conviction (46%).

**Table 4. State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties released prior to case disposition, 1990-2004**

Variable	Percent released	Predicted probability of release
<b>Most serious arrest charge</b>		
Murder	19%	11%**
Rape	53	44**
Robbery	44	36**
Assault	64	50*
Burglary	49	49**
Motor vehicle theft	49	50**
Larceny/theft	68	66
Forgery	72	67
Fraud	82	76**
Drug sales (reference)	63	63
Other drug (non-sales)	68	70*
Weapons	67	65
Driving-related	73	76**
<b>Age at arrest</b>		
Under 21 (reference)	68%	64%
21-29	62	63
30-39	59	60**
40 or older	62	60**
<b>Gender</b>		
Male (reference)	60%	60%
Female	74	69**
<b>Race/Hispanic origin</b>		
White non-Hispanic (reference)	68%	66%
Black non-Hispanic	62	64
Other non-Hispanic	65	63*
Hispanic, any race	55	51**
<b>Criminal justice status at arrest</b>		
No active status (reference)	70%	67%
Released on pending case	61	63
On probation	43	49**
On parole	26	37**
<b>Prior arrest and court appearance</b>		
No prior arrests (reference)	79%	65%
Prior arrest record without FTA	59	62*
Prior arrest record with FTA	50	58*
<b>Most serious prior conviction</b>		
No prior convictions (reference)	77%	70%
Misdemeanor	63	64**
Felony	46	51**

Note: Logistic regression (predicted probability) results exclude the year 1990 because of missing data. Asterisks indicate category differed from the reference category at one of the following significance levels: \* $\leq .05$ , \*\* $\leq .01$ . Not all variables in the model are shown. See *Methodology* on page 11 for more information.

**About 1 in 5 detained defendants eventually had their case dismissed or were acquitted**

Sixty percent of released defendants were eventually convicted — 46% of a felony and 14% of a misdemeanor (table 5). Conviction rates were higher for detained defendants, with 78% convicted, including 69% of a felony.

**On average, released defendants waited nearly 3 times longer than detainees for case adjudication**

Released defendants waited a median of 127 days from time of arrest until adjudication, nearly 3 times as long as those who were detained (45 days). For those released, the average time from release to adjudication was nearly 1 month longer for those on financial release (125 days) than for those released under non-financial conditions (101 days) (table 6). By specific release type, defendants released on recognizance had the shortest wait (98 days), while those released on property bond had the longest (140 days).

**Table 5. Adjudication outcomes for released and detained State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties, 1990-2004**

	Released defendants	Detained defendants
<b>Adjudication outcome</b>		
Convicted	60%	78%
Felony	46	69
Misdemeanor	14	9
Not convicted	40%	22%
Dismissal/acquittal	31	19
Other outcome	9	2
<b>Median number of days from arrest to adjudication</b>	127 days	45 days

Note: Detail may not add to total because of rounding.

**Table 6. Time from pretrial release until adjudication of State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties, 1990-2004**

Type of release	Average time	
	Mean	Median
All types	112 days	90 days
<b>Financial releases</b>	125 days	106 days
Surety bond	125	106
Full cash bond	122	100
Deposit bond	126	108
Property bond	140	120
<b>Non-financial releases</b>	101 days	75 days
Recognizance	98	72
Conditional	103	75
Unsecured bond	110	86

**Incidents of pretrial misconduct increased with length of time in release status**

The number of defendants charged with pretrial misconduct increased with the length of time spent in a release status. About a third (32%) of failure-to-appear bench warrants were issued within a month of release and about two-thirds (68%) within 3 months. The pattern was similar for rearrests, with 29% occurring within 1 month of release and 62% within 3 months.

	Cumulative percent of pretrial misconduct occurring within —			
	1 week	1 month	3 months	6 months
Any type	9%	32%	67%	88%
Failure to appear	9	32	68	89
Rearrest	8	29	62	85

**A third of released defendants were charged with pretrial misconduct within 1 year after release**

From 1990 through 2004, 33% of defendants were charged with committing one or more types of misconduct after being released but prior to the disposition of their case (figure 4). A bench warrant for failure to appear in court was issued for 23% of released defendants. An estimated 17% were arrested for a new offense, including 11% for a felony.

**Pretrial misconduct rates for State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties, 1990-2004**




Figure 4

### Pretrial misconduct rates stable from 1990-2004

Overall misconduct rates varied only slightly from 1990 through 2004, ranging from a high of 35% to a low of 31% (figure 5). For failure to appear, the range was from 21% to 24%, and the fugitive rate ranged from 5% to 8%. Overall rearrest rates ranged from 13% to 21%, and felony rearrest rates from 10% to 13%.




Figure 5

### Pretrial misconduct rates highest for emergency releases

About half (52%) of the 1% of defendants released under an emergency order to relieve jail crowding were charged with some type of misconduct (table 7). Pretrial misconduct rates for other types of releases ranged from 27% to 36%.

After emergency release (45%), the highest failure-to-appear rate was for defendants released on unsecured bond (30%). Property bond (14%), which also accounted for just 1% of releases, had the lowest failure-to-appear rate followed by surety bond (18%).

### About 1 in 4 defendants who failed to appear in court were fugitives at end of a 1-year study period

By type of release, the percent of the defendants who were fugitives after 1 year ranged from 10% for unsecured bond releases to 3% of those released on surety bond.

Overall, 28% of the defendants who failed to appear in court and had a bench warrant issued for their arrest were still fugitives at the end of a 1-year study period. This was 6% of all defendants released pretrial (not shown in table).

Compared to the overall average, the percentage of absconded defendants who remained a fugitive was lower for surety bond releases (19%).

Type of release	Number of defendants failing to appear	Percent still a fugitive after 1 year
All types	54,485	28%
Surety bond	13,411	19%
Emergency	1,168	22
Conditional	6,788	27
Property bond	490	30
Recognizance	20,883	30
Deposit	4,548	31
Unsecured bond	5,018	33
Full cash bond	2,179	36

### Likelihood of pretrial misconduct lower for defendants released after being charged with murder or rape

Defendants released after being charged with murder (19%) or rape (18%) had misconduct rates that were about half that for defendants charged with motor vehicle theft (39%), drug trafficking (39%), or burglary (37%).

### Younger, male, black, and Hispanic defendants more likely to be charged with pretrial misconduct

Released defendants age 20 or younger (33%) had higher misconduct rates than those age 40 or older (28%). This pattern also existed for rearrest and failure-to-appear rates. Male defendants (34%) had a higher misconduct rate than females (28%). Black (36%) and Hispanic (34%) defendants had a higher misconduct rate than whites (28%).

### Prior criminal activity associated with greater probability of pretrial misconduct

Defendants who had an active criminal justice status at the time of arrest — such as pretrial release (48%), parole (47%), or probation (44%) — had a higher misconduct rate than those who were not on a criminal justice status (27%). This difference was observed for both failure to appear and rearrest.

Defendants with a prior failure to appear (49%) had a higher misconduct rate than defendants who had previously made all court appearances (30%) or had never been arrested (23%). Defendants with a prior failure to appear (35%) were about twice as likely to have a bench warrant issued for failing to appear during the current case than other defendants (18%).

Defendants with at least one prior felony conviction (43%) had a higher rate of pretrial misconduct than defendants with misdemeanor convictions only (34%) or no prior convictions (27%).

**Table 7. State court felony defendants in the 75 largest counties charged with pretrial misconduct, 1990-2004**

Variable	Number of defendants	Percent of released defendants charged with pretrial misconduct			
		Any type	Rearrest	Failure to appear	Fugitive
<b>Type of pretrial release</b>					
Release on recognizance	80,865	34%	17%	26%	8%
Surety bond	78,023	29	16	18	3
Conditional release	31,162	32	15	22	6
Deposit bond	20,993	30	14	22	7
Unsecured bond	17,001	36	14	30	10
Full cash bond	11,190	30	15	20	7
Property bond	3,649	27	17	14	4
Emergency release	2,658	52	17	45	10
<b>Most serious arrest charge</b>					
Murder	741	19%	12%	9%	1%
Rape	3,481	18	9	10	2
Robbery	12,947	35	21	21	6
Assault	32,931	23	12	14	4
Burglary	18,377	37	19	25	6
Larceny/theft	26,667	33	16	25	7
Motor vehicle theft	6,415	39	20	29	7
Forgery	8,374	33	15	24	7
Fraud	8,094	21	8	15	5
Drug trafficking	47,182	39	21	27	8
Other drug	50,547	37	18	29	8
Weapons	8,574	27	13	17	5
Driving-related	8,148	28	14	18	5
<b>Age at arrest</b>					
20 or younger	55,505	33%	20%	21%	5%
21-29	90,768	34	17	24	7
30-39	71,049	33	16	24	7
40 or older	44,701	28	13	20	6
<b>Gender</b>					
Male	211,398	34%	18%	23%	6%
Female	52,291	28	12	21	6
<b>Race/Hispanic origin</b>					
Black, non-Hispanic	96,348	36%	19%	25%	7%
White, non-Hispanic	64,571	28	14	19	4
Hispanic, any race	49,544	34	17	25	8
Other, non-Hispanic	5,165	23	13	14	3
<b>Criminal justice status at arrest</b>					
On parole	6,012	47%	25%	32%	7%
On probation	25,765	44	26	30	6
Released pending prior case	25,955	48	30	30	7
No active status	167,227	27	12	19	6
<b>Prior arrests and FTA history</b>					
Prior arrest record with FTA	59,468	49%	27%	35%	8%
Prior arrest record, no FTA	75,806	30	17	18	5
No prior arrests	85,366	23	8	18	7
<b>Most serious prior conviction</b>					
Felony	75,187	43%	25%	28%	6%
Misdemeanor	44,989	34	19	23	5
No prior convictions	129,875	27	12	19	7

### Logistic regression analysis of pretrial misconduct

Logistic regression was used to assess the impact of given characteristics independent of other factors on the probability of a released defendant being charged with pretrial misconduct. The predicted probabilities generated from these analyses are presented in the adjacent table. (See *Methodology* for more information on logistic regression).

#### Type of release

Predicted overall misconduct rates were higher for unsecured bond (42%) and emergency (56%) releases. This was also the case for rearrest and failure to appear rates. Property (17%), surety (20%), deposit (20%), and full cash (20%) bonds all had lower predicted failure-to-appear rates than recognizance (24%). The percent of released defendants predicted to be fugitives after 1 year was lowest for property (3%) and surety bonds (4%). Emergency release and property bonds each accounted for 1% of all releases, compared to about 30% each for surety bonds and recognizance. (See table 7 for the number of defendants accounted for by each type of pretrial release).

#### Arrest offense

Drug trafficking defendants (38%) had higher predicted rates of overall misconduct, rearrest and failure-to-appear than defendants charged with murder (19%), rape (21%), assault (26%), fraud (29%), or a weapons offense (31%).

#### Demographic characteristics

Defendants age 20 or younger (39%) had a higher predicted misconduct rate than those ages 21 to 39 (35%) or age 40 or older (30%). This pattern held for rearrest, but for court appearance record only defendants age 40 or older were predicted to perform better than those under age 21.

Male defendants (35%) were predicted to have a higher misconduct rate than females (32%). Hispanic (37%) and black (36%) defendants were predicted to be charged with misconduct more often than whites (32%). This difference also existed for failure to appear, but not rearrest.

#### Criminal history

Defendants with an active criminal justice status at the time of arrest, such as parole (42%), probation (39%), or pretrial release (42%), had higher predicted misconduct rates than those without such a status (33%). This difference was observed for both failure to appear and rearrest.

Compared to those without prior arrests (29%), defendants with an arrest record were predicted to be charged with misconduct more often, especially if they had previously failed to appear in court (47%). This pattern was observed for both failure to appear and rearrest. Defendants with prior felony convictions (39%) had a higher predicted misconduct rate than other defendants (33%). This pattern also existed for rearrest, but not failure to appear.

Variable	Predicted probability of being charged with pretrial misconduct			
	Any type	Rearrest	Failure to appear	Fugitive
<b>Type of pretrial release</b>				
Recognizance (reference)	34%	17%	24%	6%
Surety bond	33	19	20**	4**
Conditional release	37	18	24	6
Deposit bond	32	18	20*	5
Unsecured bond	42**	21*	28*	8
Full cash bond	34	19	20*	6
Property bond	31	18	17**	3**
Emergency release	56**	26**	39*	8
<b>Most serious arrest charge</b>				
Drug trafficking (reference)	38%	20%	24%	6%
Murder	19**	11*	8**	1
Rape	21**	11**	10**	2**
Robbery	32**	18	19**	5
Assault	26**	15**	14**	3**
Burglary	37	19	23	5*
Larceny/theft	37	19	25	6
Motor Vehicle theft	39	20	27*	5
Forgery	38	19	27	6
Fraud	29**	15**	18**	4**
Other drug	42**	21	29**	7
Weapons	31**	16**	19**	4**
Driving-related	33**	16**	22	6
<b>Age at arrest</b>				
20 or younger (reference)	39%	24%	22%	4%
21-29	35**	19**	23	5**
30-39	35**	17**	23	6**
40 or older	30**	14**	20**	5**
<b>Gender</b>				
Male (reference)	35%	19%	22%	5%
Female	32**	16**	22	5
<b>Race/Hispanic origin</b>				
White, non-Hispanic (reference)	32%	18%	20%	4%
Black, non-Hispanic	36**	19	23**	5**
Other, non-Hispanic	27*	16	16*	3
Hispanic, any race	37**	19	25**	7**
<b>Criminal justice status at arrest</b>				
No active status (reference)	33%	17%	21%	5%
Released pending prior case	42**	24**	26**	5
On probation	38**	22**	25**	5
On parole	42**	20	29**	6
<b>Prior arrests and FTA history</b>				
No prior arrests (reference)	29%	13%	20%	5%
Prior arrest record with FTA	47**	26**	31**	6*
Prior arrest record, no FTA	33**	20**	19	4**
<b>Most serious prior conviction</b>				
No prior convictions (reference)	33%	17%	22%	6%
Misdemeanor	33	17	21	4**
Felony	39**	22**	23	4**

Note: Asterisks indicate category differed from reference category at one of the following significance levels: \* $\leq .05$ , \*\* $\leq .01$ . Not all variables in model are shown. See *Methodology* on page 11 for more information. /Murder defendants were excluded from the fugitive analysis.

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## Methodology

### *Data utilized*

This report analyzed data from the State Court Processing Statistics (SCPS) series, covering felony cases filed in May of even-numbered years from 1990 through 2004. SCPS is a biennial data collection series that examines felony cases processed in a sample of 40 of the Nation's 75 most populous counties. The counties included in the sample have varied over time to account for changing national population patterns. For a year-by-year summary of the counties participating in SCPS, see Appendix table 1. For more information on the SCPS methodology see the BJS report *Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2002* at <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/fdluc02.htm>.

Each SCPS data collection tracks approximately 15,000 felony cases for up to one year, with the exception of murder defendants who are followed for up to two years. In addition to defendant demographic characteristics and criminal history, SCPS also obtains data on a variety of felony case processing factors, including the types of arrest charges filed, conditions of pretrial release such as bail amount and type of release, and instances of pretrial misconduct including failure to appear in court, rearrest while on pretrial release, and other violations that resulted in the revocation of release. Adjudication and sentencing outcomes are also recorded.

### *Using multivariate statistical techniques*

This report analyzes pretrial release and misconduct through both bivariate and multivariate statistical techniques. While the bivariate statistics provide a descriptive overview of pretrial release and misconduct among felony defendants in the 75 most populous counties, multivariate analysis can help disentangle the impacts that independent variables such as demographic characteristics, prior criminal history, severity of arrest charges, and release type have on dependent variables such as the probability of pretrial release and misconduct. Logistic regression models were used to estimate the probability of pretrial release and misconduct. This is one widely accepted method for analyzing the effects of multiple independent factors on dichotomous or binomial outcomes.

The regression analyses excluded data from 1990 because of the large number of cases missing data on race or Hispanic origin. The regression models also excluded cases that had missing data on either the independent or dependent variables. This resulted in reductions in the number of cases analyzed. From 1992 through 2004, 99,899 felony defendants were either released or detained, but when missing data were excluded from the regression models, the number of cases analyzed declined to 71,027.

To determine the impact of missing data, logistic regression models excluded certain independent factors to increase the number of analyzed cases. Since the results from these

analyses did not differ appreciably from the full model, missing data did not affect the results.

SCPS data are drawn from a sample and weighted to represent cases processed in the 75 most populous counties during the month of May. When the regressions used these weighted data, the large number of weighted cases resulted in statistical significance for nearly all the variables in the model. Effect weighting was employed to address this issue. Through effect weighting, the SCPS data were weighted to the number of cases actually sampled rather than the number of cases in the universe represented by the sample.

### *Generalized estimating equation techniques*

One primary assumption of binary logistic regression is that all observations in the dataset are independent. This assumption is not necessarily appropriate for the SCPS series because the data are collected on a county basis. The county-based nature of SCPS creates a presumption of clustered data. In clustered datasets, "the data can be grouped into natural or imposed clusters with observations in the same clusters tending to be more alike than observations in different clusters." The clustered nature of the SCPS data was handled by utilizing generalized estimating equation (GEE) techniques. Logistic regression modeling with generalized estimating equation (GEE) techniques provides for more efficient computation of regression coefficients and more robust standard error estimates.

### *Interpreting logistic regression probabilities*

Logistic regression produces nonlinear estimations for each independent variable that can be difficult to interpret. In this report, the logistic regression coefficients are made interpretable by transforming them into predicted probabilities (see table 4 and box on page 10). The predicted probabilities were calculated by setting all independent variables to their mean levels, setting the independent variable of interest to a value of one, multiplying the means of each independent variable by their respective logistic regression parameter estimates, taking the exponential function of the summed product of means and parameter estimates, and then calculating the probability of that exponential function.

### *Limitations of models*

The logistic regression analyses were limited and intended to reflect the effects of only selected factors that were available in the SCPS data. Other factors could potentially be related to pretrial release and misconduct. Examples of these include: defendants' residence, employment status, community ties, mental health status, and substance abuse. If data on these variables were available, the logistic regression results could be altered.

\*Paul D. Allison, 2001. *Logistic Regression Using the SAS System: Theory and Application*, Cary, N.C.: SAS Institute Inc., page 179.

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*Additional sources on bail and pretrial release include:*

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Kennedy, Spurgeon and D. Alan Henry. *Commercial Surety Bail: Assessing Its Role in the Pretrial Release and Detention Decision* <<http://www.pretrial.org/publications.html>> (1996).

Watson, Jerry W. and L. Jay Labe, "Bail Bonds," chap. 8 in *The Law of Miscellaneous and Commercial Surety Bonds*, Chicago, IL: American Bar Association, 2001, pp. 127-142.

The Bureau of Justice Statistics is the statistical agency of the U.S. Department of Justice. Jeffrey L. Sedgwick is the director.

This Special Report was written by Thomas H. Cohen, Ph.D., and Brian A. Reaves, Ph.D. William J. Sabol, Ph.D. provided technical assistance. Tracey Kyckelhahn provided verification. Tina Dorsey produced and edited the report, under the supervision of Doris J. James. Jayne Robinson prepared the report for final printing.

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This report in portable document format and in ASCII and its related statistical data and tables are available at the BJS World Wide Web Internet site: <<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/prfdsc.htm>>.

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Appendix table 1. State Court Processing Statistics, participating jurisdictions, 1990-2004

County or equivalent	Number of cases		Year of participation							
	Unweighted	Weighted	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004
Jefferson (AL)	1,517	6,612			■	■	■	■	■	■
Maricopa (AZ)	4,245	13,848	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Pima (AZ)	2,655	7,588			■	■	■	■	■	■
Alameda (CA)	1,941	8,471			■	■	■	■	■	■
Contra Costa (CA)	817	2,043			■	■	■	■	■	■
Los Angeles (CA)	10,419	41,676	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Orange (CA)	2,984	9,964	■			■	■	■	■	■
Riverside (CA)	1,646	5,928						■	■	■
Sacramento (CA)	1,898	6,786	■	■	■	■	■			
San Bernardino (CA)	3,061	9,909	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
San Diego (CA)	1,529	6,604	■	■				■	■	■
San Francisco (CA)	1,327	5,675		■	■	■	■			
San Mateo (CA)	526	1,315						■	■	■
Santa Clara (CA)	2,840	9,552	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Ventura (CA)	576	1,901			■	■	■			
New Haven (CT)	238	1,047						■		
Washington (DC)	263	1,315	■	■						
Broward (FL)	2,155	7,095	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Duval (FL)	387	1,935	■	■				■	■	■
Miami-Dade (FL)	4,355	17,420	■	■	■	■	■			
Hillsborough (FL)	1,415	4,515	■	■	■	■	■			
Orange (FL)	1,367	5,938			■	■	■			
Palm Beach (FL)	1,154	4,255						■	■	■
Pinellas (FL)	1,687	6,290	■	■				■	■	■
Fulton (GA)	1,748	6,992	■	■		■	■	■	■	■
Honolulu (HI)	890	2,692	■		■	■	■	■	■	■
Cook (IL)	5,738	22,952	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
DuPage (IL)	463	1,528			■	■	■			
Marion (IN)	2,878	9,908				■	■	■	■	■
Jefferson (KY)	310	1,240			■	■	■			
Essex (MA)	546	2,004	■	■						
Middlesex (MA)	657	2,168			■					
Suffolk (MA)	1,546	5,753	■	■	■	■	■			
Baltimore (MD)	1,006	2,515						■	■	■
Baltimore (city) (MD)	1,542	4,108				■	■			
Montgomery (MD)	1,216	3,494		■			■	■	■	■
Macomb (MI)	644	1,610						■	■	■
Wayne (MI)	2,030	8,120	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Jackson (MO)	999	3,297								
St. Louis (MO)	1,582	5,447	■	■	■	■	■			
Essex (NJ)	2,636	11,947	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Bronx (NY)	3,713	15,404	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Erie (NY)	1,048	4,134	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Kings (NY)	3,893	15,988	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Monroe (NY)	1,124	3,874	■	■	■	■	■			
Nassau (NY)	772	1,930						■	■	■
New York (NY)	2,801	11,204	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Queens (NY)	2,058	7,943	■	■	■	■	■			
Suffolk (NY)	778	2,567			■	■	■			
Westchester (NY)	980	2,450						■	■	■
Franklin (OH)	618	2,719						■	■	■
Hamilton (OH)	1,188	4,970	■	■	■	■	■			
Allegheny (PA)	502	1,516	■	■	■	■	■			
Montgomery (PA)	567	2,225	■	■					■	■
Philadelphia (PA)	4,043	15,952	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Shelby (TN)	2,837	11,332	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Dallas (TX)	2,169	8,676	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
El Paso (TX)	949	2,373						■	■	■
Harris (TX)	3,661	14,644	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Tarrant (TX)	1,526	6,941	■	■				■	■	■
Travis (TX)	680	2,904						■	■	■
Salt Lake (UT)	1,212	4,981	■	■				■	■	■
Fairfax (VA)	1,158	4,670								
King (WA)	1,324	5,591	■	■	■	■	■			
Milwaukee (WI)	1,542	5,161		■	■	■	■			

**Appendix table 2. Logistic regression analysis of pretrial release decision**

Variable	Mean	Estimate	Standard error
<b>Most serious arrest charge</b>			
Murder	0.0084	-2.6575**	0.2412
Rape	0.0142	-0.7846**	0.1173
Robbery	0.0588	-1.1088**	0.1004
Assault	0.1222	-0.1821*	0.0785
Other violent	0.0401	-0.1755	0.1173
Burglary	0.0870	-0.5562**	0.0817
Larceny	0.0888	0.1313	0.0805
Motor vehicle theft	0.0342	-0.5281**	0.0997
Forgery	0.0279	0.1781	0.1052
Fraud	0.0274	0.6323**	0.1660
Other property	0.0411	0.3007	0.1655
Other drug	0.1995	0.3023*	0.1384
Weapons	0.0272	0.1001	0.1074
Driving-related	0.0276	0.8147**	0.1306
Other public order	0.0294	0.0926	0.1332
<b>Age at arrest</b>			
21-29	0.3423	-0.0544	0.0357
30-39	0.2871	-0.1700**	0.0451
40 or older	0.1884	-0.1713**	0.0456
<b>Gender</b>			
Female	0.1735	0.4031**	0.0393
<b>Race/Hispanic origin</b>			
Black, non-Hispanic	0.4456	-0.1274	0.0690
Other, non-Hispanic	0.0229	-0.1692*	0.0734
Hispanic, any race	0.2432	-0.6488**	0.1122
<b>Criminal justice status at arrest</b>			
Other status	0.0283	-0.9417**	0.1509
Released pending prior case	0.1057	-0.1758	0.1325
On probation	0.1605	-0.7471**	0.0686
On parole	0.0610	-1.2450**	0.1671
<b>Prior arrest and FTA history</b>			
Prior arrest record with FTA	0.3050	-0.3144*	0.1468
Prior arrest record, no FTA	0.4205	-0.1597*	0.0749
<b>Most serious prior conviction</b>			
Felony	0.4156	-0.8396**	0.0756
Misdemeanor	0.1746	-0.2886**	0.0847
<b>Study year</b>			
1992	0.0940	0.2602	0.1513
1994	0.1212	0.1664	0.1515
1996	0.1332	0.3148*	0.1512
1998	0.1276	0.1924	0.1475
2000	0.1731	0.1250	0.1190
2002	0.1795	0.1576	0.1069
<b>Intercept</b>	1.0000	1.4226	0.1652
<b>Number of observations</b>	71,027		
<b>Log likelihood</b>	-41377.1132		

Note: Logistic regression figures derived from generalized estimating equation (GEE) methods. GEE logistic regression procedures were an appropriate technique because of the clustered nature of the felony case processing data. The regression estimates were transformed into predicted probabilities in the report by setting all independent variables at their mean levels, setting the independent variable of interest to a value of one, and then calculating the probability of the dependent measure outcome for that particular independent variable. Asterisks indicate category difference from the reference category at one of the following significance levels: \*>=.05, \*\*>=.01.

**Appendix table 3. Logistic regression analysis of pretrial misconduct**

Variable	Mean	Estimate	Standard error
<b>Most serious arrest charge</b>			
Murder	0.0019	-0.9339**	0.2569
Rape	0.0118	-0.8203**	0.1123
Robbery	0.0329	-0.2552**	0.0930
Assault	0.1212	-0.5577**	0.0584
Other violent	0.0414	-0.5564**	0.0829
Burglary	0.0684	-0.0368	0.0745
Larceny	0.0985	-0.0148	0.0585
Motor vehicle theft	0.0270	0.0616	0.0858
Forgery	0.0318	0.0264	0.0884
Fraud	0.0373	-0.3690**	0.1076
Other property	0.0472	-0.1442*	0.0824
Other drug	0.2255	0.1666**	0.0544
Weapons	0.0273	-0.2932**	0.0635
Driving-related	0.0327	-0.1878**	0.0694
Other public order	0.0290	-0.4768**	0.1095
<b>Age at arrest</b>			
21-29	0.3403	-0.1352**	0.0251
30-39	0.2737	-0.1736**	0.0428
40 or older	0.1865	-0.3842**	0.0399
<b>Gender</b>			
Female	0.2148	-0.1258**	0.0390
<b>Race/Hispanic origin</b>			
Black, non-Hispanic	0.4449	0.1695**	0.0317
Other, non-Hispanic	0.0238	-0.2248*	0.0897
Hispanic, any race	0.2021	0.2163**	0.0334
<b>Criminal justice status at arrest</b>			
Other status	0.0177	0.1061	0.1047
Released pending prior case	0.0943	0.4042**	0.0561
On probation	0.1105	0.2764**	0.0475
On parole	0.0239	0.3778**	0.1046
<b>Prior arrest and FTA history</b>			
Prior arrest record with FTA	0.2371	0.7565**	0.0540
Prior arrest record, no FTA	0.4111	0.1758**	0.0438
<b>Most serious prior conviction</b>			
Felony	0.3034	0.2417**	0.0496
Misdemeanor	0.1807	-0.0071	0.0482
<b>Type of pretrial release</b>			
Surety bond	0.3714	-0.0570	0.0682
Full cash bond	0.0352	-0.0408	0.1078
Deposit bond	0.0957	-0.0963	0.1114
Property bond	0.0118	-0.1435	0.1249
Conditional release	0.1443	0.1107	0.0850
Unsecured bond	0.0647	0.3188**	0.1036
Emergency release	0.0105	0.8663**	0.1830
<b>Study year</b>			
1992	0.1007	-0.2136	0.1483
1994	0.1199	-0.1810	0.1237
1996	0.1378	-0.2908	0.1746
1998	0.1171	-0.3394*	0.1588
2000	0.1797	-0.2050	0.1332
2002	0.1828	-0.1417	0.1146
Intercept	1.0000	-0.6608	0.1264
Number of observations	40,179		
Log likelihood	-23469.1617		

Note. See note on appendix table 2. Asterisks indicate category difference from the reference category at one of the following significance levels: \*>=.05, \*\*>=.01.

**Appendix table 4. Logistic regression analysis of pretrial rearrest for new offense**

Variable	Mean	Estimate	Standard error
<b>Most serious arrest charge</b>			
Murder	0.0018	-0.7451*	0.3078
Rape	0.0119	-0.7720**	0.1070
Robbery	0.0329	-0.1737	0.0987
Assault	0.1215	-0.3388**	0.0670
Other violent	0.0415	-0.3810**	0.0955
Burglary	0.0685	-0.0593	0.0708
Larceny	0.0986	-0.0589	0.0584
Motor vehicle theft	0.0270	-0.0229	0.0790
Forgery	0.0320	-0.1010	0.0875
Fraud	0.0377	-0.3578**	0.1238
Other property	0.0471	-0.1260	0.0752
Other drug	0.2233	0.0585	0.0604
Weapons	0.0275	-0.3018**	0.1159
Driving-related	0.0329	-0.3122**	0.0842
Other public order	0.0292	-0.3861**	0.0949
<b>Age at arrest</b>			
21-29	0.3407	-0.3505**	0.0338
30-39	0.2731	-0.4504**	0.0399
40 or older	0.1870	-0.6585**	0.0472
<b>Gender</b>			
Female	0.2155	-0.2279**	0.0344
<b>Race/Hispanic origin</b>			
Black, non-Hispanic	0.4468	0.0653	0.0430
Other, non-Hispanic	0.0238	-0.1297	0.1010
Hispanic, any race	0.1999	0.0705	0.0468
<b>Criminal justice status at arrest</b>			
Other status	0.0177	0.2058*	0.0979
Released pending prior case	0.0953	0.4476**	0.0485
On probation	0.1099	0.3147**	0.0501
On parole	0.0240	0.1713	0.1054
<b>Prior arrest and FTA history</b>			
Prior arrest record with FTA	0.2370	0.8455**	0.0701
Prior arrest record, no FTA	0.4136	0.4895**	0.0578
<b>Most serious prior conviction</b>			
Felony	0.3049	0.3581**	0.0617
Misdemeanor	0.1807	0.0471	0.0552
<b>Type of pretrial release</b>			
Surety bond	0.3747	0.1077	0.0611
Full cash bond	0.0350	0.0991	0.1273
Deposit bond	0.0969	0.0800	0.1089
Property bond	0.0119	0.0404	0.1462
Conditional release	0.1453	0.0640	0.0842
Unsecured bond	0.0655	0.2473*	0.1160
Emergency release	0.0104	0.5156**	0.1371
<b>Study year</b>			
1992	0.0981	-0.5280**	0.1859
1994	0.1145	-0.3974	0.2419
1996	0.1378	-0.4183	0.2615
1998	0.1152	-0.4412*	0.1998
2000	0.1836	-0.3840**	0.1466
2002	0.1866	-0.2230	0.1244
<b>Intercept</b>	1.0000	-1.3631	0.1478
<b>Number of observations</b>	39,209		
<b>Log Likelihood</b>	-15735.4776		

Note. See not on appendix table 2. Asterisks indicate category difference from the reference category at one of the following significance levels: \* $\geq .05$ , \*\* $\geq .01$ .

**Appendix table 5. Logistic regression analysis of pretrial failure to appear**

Variable	Mean	Estimate	Standard error
<b>Most serious arrest charge</b>			
Murder	0.0019	-1.3123**	0.3566
Rape	0.0118	-1.0242**	0.1934
Robbery	0.0329	-0.2917**	0.0810
Assault	0.1212	-0.6787**	0.0599
Other violent	0.0413	-0.7196**	0.0721
Burglary	0.0683	-0.0595	0.0690
Larceny	0.0987	0.0527	0.0667
Motor vehicle theft	0.0271	0.1741*	0.0895
Forgery	0.0319	0.1358	0.0897
Fraud	0.0374	-0.3719**	0.1115
Other property	0.0471	-0.0572	0.0756
Other drug	0.2245	0.2330**	0.0586
Weapons	0.0275	-0.2747**	0.0660
Driving-related	0.0328	-0.0964	0.0710
Other public order	0.0289	-0.4888**	0.1249
<b>Age at arrest</b>			
21-29	0.3404	0.0299	0.0296
30-39	0.2737	0.0363	0.0471
40 or older	0.1869	-0.1253**	0.0415
<b>Gender</b>			
Female	0.2150	-0.0300	0.0380
<b>Race/Hispanic origin</b>			
Black, non-Hispanic	0.4450	0.2006**	0.0377
Other, non-Hispanic	0.0238	-0.2508*	0.1023
Hispanic, any race	0.2019	0.2970**	0.0459
<b>Criminal justice status at arrest</b>			
Other status	0.0177	0.0778	0.1026
Released pending prior case	0.0947	0.2711**	0.0570
On probation	0.1103	0.2347**	0.0556
On parole	0.0238	0.4306**	0.1076
<b>Prior arrest and FTA history</b>			
Prior arrest record with FTA	0.2376	0.5902**	0.0646
Prior arrest record, no FTA	0.4106	-0.0505	0.0458
<b>Most serious prior conviction</b>			
Felony	0.3038	0.0494	0.0603
Misdemeanor	0.1805	-0.0438	0.0414
<b>Type of pretrial release</b>			
Surety bond	0.3712	-0.2713**	0.0890
Full cash bond	0.0353	-0.2444*	0.1047
Deposit bond	0.0962	-0.2307*	0.1193
Property bond	0.0117	-0.4271**	0.1499
Conditional release	0.1447	-0.0119	0.0958
Unsecured bond	0.0650	0.2051*	0.1063
Emergency release	0.0108	0.6762*	0.2823
<b>Study year</b>			
1992	0.1003	0.0228	0.0958
1994	0.1202	-0.0754	0.0906
1996	0.1356	-0.0846	0.0849
1998	0.1180	-0.0251	0.0864
2000	0.1801	-0.0041	0.0903
2002	0.1838	0.0413	0.1050
Intercept	1.0000	-1.3378	0.1278
Number of observations	39,838		
Log likelihood	-19756.0265		

Note. See not on appendix table 2. Asterisks indicate category difference from the reference category at one of the following significance levels: \* $\geq .05$ , \*\* $\geq .01$ .

Appendix table 6. Logistic regression analysis of pretrial fugitive status			
Variable	Mean	Estimate	Standard error
<b>Most serious arrest charge</b>			
Rape	0.0118	-1.2836**	0.2824
Robbery	0.0330	-0.3058	0.1690
Assault	0.1215	-0.8666**	0.1170
Other violent	0.0414	-0.8022**	0.1352
Burglary	0.0684	-0.2789*	0.1133
Larceny	0.0988	0.0044	0.0817
Motor vehicle theft	0.0271	-0.2829	0.1506
Forgery	0.0320	-0.1446	0.1210
Fraud	0.0375	-0.5742**	0.2041
Other property	0.0471	-0.2003	0.1418
Other drug	0.2250	0.0861	0.1021
Weapons	0.0275	-0.3852**	0.1358
Driving - related	0.0329	-0.0587	0.1268
Other public order	0.0289	-0.6688**	0.1355
<b>Age at arrest</b>			
21-29	0.3404	0.3634**	0.0685
30-39	0.2739	0.3892**	0.0556
40 or older	0.1870	0.2437**	0.0700
<b>Gender</b>			
Female	0.2153	-0.1027	0.0717
<b>Race/Hispanic origin</b>			
Black, non-Hispanic	0.4449	0.2836**	0.0767
Other, non-Hispanic	0.0238	-0.1648	0.1917
Hispanic, any race	0.2020	0.6593**	0.0905
<b>Criminal justice status at arrest</b>			
Other status	0.0177	0.0222	0.1925
Released pending prior case	0.0949	0.0150	0.0744
On probation	0.1103	0.0332	0.0738
On parole	0.0236	0.2334	0.1520
<b>Prior arrest and FTA history</b>			
Prior arrest record with FTA	0.2379	0.1558*	0.0732
Prior arrest record, no FTA	0.4104	-0.3075**	0.0742
<b>Most serious prior conviction</b>			
Felony	0.3037	-0.2730**	0.1049
Misdemeanor	0.1806	-0.2527**	0.0663
<b>Type of pretrial release</b>			
Surety bond	0.3710	-0.6047**	0.1126
Full cash bond	0.0353	-0.0503	0.1600
Deposit bond	0.0962	-0.3515	0.3069
Property bond	0.0116	-0.7676**	0.2294
Conditional release	0.1448	-0.0633	0.1156
Unsecured bond	0.0650	0.1997	0.1726
Emergency release	0.0106	0.2469	0.2407
<b>Study year</b>			
1992	0.1002	0.3370**	0.1208
1994	0.1201	0.1748	0.1116
1996	0.1357	0.1633	0.0965
1998	0.1180	0.2129	0.1388
2000	0.1802	0.2684**	0.0908
2002	0.1835	0.1906	0.1112
Intercept	1.0000	-2.9223	0.1845
Number of observations	39,752		
Log Likelihood	-8391.7631		

Note. See note on appendix table 2. Asterisks indicate category difference from the reference category at one of the following significance levels: \* $\geq .05$ , \*\* $\geq .01$ .

# Bail Bond Rate Comparison

For bail bonds \$5,000.00 or less. Prepared for The Honorable Dwight Cook by Ike Umunnah (Intern)

	ND/Curtent (10%)	ND-Proposed (15%)	IC Amend	Minnesota	Montana	
\$5,000.00	\$500.00	\$750.00 (50% Increase)	\$500.00 (33.3% Decrease)	\$500.00	\$500.00	
% Change						
\$4,000.00	\$400.00	\$600.00 (50% Increase)	\$600.00 (50% Increase)	\$400.00	\$400.00	
% Change						
\$3,000.00	\$300.00	\$450.00 (50% Increase)	\$450.00 (50% Increase)	\$300.00	\$300.00	
% Change						
\$2,000.00	\$200.00	\$300.00 (50% Increase)	\$300.00 (50% Increase)	\$200.00	\$200.00	
% Change						
\$1,000.00	\$100.00	\$150.00 (50% Increase)	\$150.00 (50% Increase)	\$100.00	\$100.00	
% Change						
\$500.00	\$75.00	\$100.00 (33.3% Increase)	\$100.00 (33.3% Increase)	\$50.00	\$50.00	
% Change						

In Colorado, the bail premium (fee) is 15% or \$50 minimum. Typically for bonds \$5,000 or larger we charge 10% of the full bail amount with approved cosigner. For example, if the bail amount is \$10,000, the premium charged is \$1,000. Most detention facilities charge bonding, booking, or filing fees of \$5-\$50 each.

SB 2063

Proposed Amendments to Senate Bill 2063

Page 1, line 6, remove "-mileage"

Page 1, line 8, overstrike "twenty" after "than" insert " fifteen percent of the amount up to \$5,000.00 and not to exceed more than 10% on amounts in excess of \$5,001.00 of bail furnished by the bail bond or agents."

Page 1, line 9, remove "fifty" and insert "one hundred"

Page 1, line 9, and remove "In addition to the premium"

Page 1, remove lines 10 through 12.